


Syntactic structure for Spanish Parasyntesis: towards a split little-v via affectedness

I claim that the syntactic structure of Spanish parasyntetic verbs *a-...-(a)r* and *en-...-(a)r* (e.g. *a-bland-(a)r* ‘to soften’, *en-dulz-(a)r* ‘to sweeten’) provides (further) evidence for a decomposed vP structure, in particular, a structure where v.CAUS and verbalizer v (and possibly also Voice) are distinct. I analyze these verbs as complex predicates with a v.CAUS-headed vP and a S(mall) C(lause) denoting a change of state/position. They differ in the properties of an applicative phrase (AppP), located between vP and SC, whose head specifies the degree of affectedness each pattern entails for the internal argument: *a-...-(a)r* entails a result state S_R for it but *en-...-(a)r* does not specify whether S_R is reached or not. Provided that *a-/en-* attach to an already verbalized base predicate and that the absence of *a-/en-* makes the verbs ungrammatical, I claim that *a-/en-* are the heads of AppP, which merges with verbalizer v which is distinct from v.CAUS. The structure I propose is represented in (1) (where External Argument=EA, Internal Argument=IA; v_1 =v.CAUS, v_2 =verbalizer, Base Predicate=BP; a possible additional VoiceP is ignored here):



Common structure. I propose that *a-...-(a)r* and *en-...-(a)r* are complex predicates with a v.CAUS head, which introduces an (in)animate external argument (EA) that triggers a change in the internal argument (IA). *a-/en-...-(a)r* verbs involve v.CAUS, since, as shown in (2, 3), EAs can be inanimate, which, according to Folli & Harley (2002), Harley (2013), among many others, is a property of v.CAUS (PAR=parasyntetic prefix):

- (2) Juan/el problema **a**-tontó a Pedro.
 John/the problem **PAR**-made.dumb DOM Peter
 ‘John/the problem made Peter feel dumb.’
- (3) Juan/el maíz **en**-gordó los pollos.
 John/the corn **PAR**-fattened the chickens
 ‘John/the corn fattened the chickens.’

I further claim that the complement of v.CAUS is SC, which denotes a change of state/position: as Folli & Harley (2002) argue, causer EAs trigger a change of state/position. (4, 5) provide evidence for this claim, based on the test *lo que le ocurrió/sucedió a x es* ‘what happened to x is’ (my translation of Cruse 1973’s test), which determines if a predicate entails a change for IA. (4, 5) show that EAs (*the problem/John*) trigger a change in IAs (*Peter/the chickens*), as indicated by the base predicates (*dumb/fat*):

- (4) Lo que le ocurrió/sucedió a Pedro es que el problema lo **a**-tontó.
 the that DAT happened to Peter is that the problem ACC **PAR**-made.dumb
 ‘What happened to Peter is that the problem made him feel dumb.’

- (5) Lo que le ocurrió/sucedió a los pollos es que Juan los **en-gordó**.
 the that DAT happened to the chicken is that John ACC **PAR**-fattened
 ‘What happened to the chickens is that John fattened them.’

Difference between *a-/en-...-(a)r*. I claim that these verbs are distinct with regard to the degree of affectedness, in particular, the entailment of the result state for the internal argument (IA) (Beavers 2011). *a-...-(a)r* entails the result state, as shown in (6), which is incompatible with a continuation that denies the change of state. *en-...-(a)r* does not specify whether a result state is reached or not, as shown in (7), making the denial of the change of state possible. The entailment test *Predicate P, pero no hay nada diferente en el tema x* ‘Predicate P, but nothing is different about the theme *x*’ (my translation of Beavers 2011’s test) makes the distinction evident:

- (6) Juan **a**-blandó la carne, #pero no hay nada diferente en ella/la carne.
 John **PAR**-softened the meat but no is nothing different about it the meat
 ‘John softened the meat, but nothing is different about it.’
- (7) Juan **en**-gordó los pollos, pero no hay nada diferente en ellos/los pollos.
 John **PAR**-fattened the chickens but no is nothing different about them the chickens
 ‘John fattened the chickens, but nothing is different about them.’

Provided that affectees are located higher than themes in the syntactic structure (Bowers 2010) and object specification (in this case, result state specification) is located outside VP (SC in this case) (Kratzer 2004), I claim that the specification for affectedness, an applicative (App) head (Pylkänen 2002), is located between vP and SC, so IA moves to Spec, AppP for result state specification. Such head has the feature Result State [S_R], which specifies how the process for IA initiated with SC ends. It could be positive [$+S_R$] or negative [$-S_R$] if the result state is entailed or not, respectively.

Towards split little-v. Two final issues need to be addressed: (i) what is the status of the prefixes *a-/en-*? and (ii) what verbalizes the base predicate? Regarding (i), since parasyntetic verbs are ungrammatical if the prefixes are not present (*a-blandar* vs. **blandar*, *en-gordar* vs. **gordar*) and there is evidence that they attach to an already verbalized base predicate (traditionally, an adjective, a noun or an adverb) (Montalbetti 1996), I propose the *a-/en-* are the morphological spell-outs of AppP with [$+S_R$]/[$-S_R$] respectively. Thus, the lack of *a-/en-* (i.e. of AppP) would mean that there is no way to know what the result state for the internal argument (IA) is, for SC does not provide this information. Regarding (ii), as mentioned, base predicates need to be verbalized before merging with *a-/en-*. Given that v-CAUS must be higher in the structure than AppP and SC, and that AppP must be higher than SC, but the base predicate must be verbalized, I posit a distinct (from v.CAUS) verbalizer v-head that (re)categorizes the base predicate (which moves to verbalizer v).

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